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Abstract—We show that it can be suboptimal for Bayesian
decision-making agents employing social learning to use correct
prior probabilities as their initial beliefs. We consider sequential
Bayesian binary hypothesis testing where each individual agent
makes a binary decision based on an initial belief, a private signal,
and the decisions of all earlier-acting agents—with the actions of
precedent agents causing updates of the initial belief. Each agent
acts to minimize Bayes risk, with all agents sharing the same
Bayes costs for Type I (false alarm) and Type II (missed detection)
errors. The effect of the set of initial beliefs on the decision-
making performance of the last agent is studied. The last agent
makes the best decision when the initial beliefs are inaccurate.
When the private signals are described by Gaussian likelihoods,
the optimal initial beliefs are not haphazard but rather follow
a systematic pattern: the earlier-acting agents should act as if
the prior probability is larger than it is in reality when the true
prior probability is small, and vice versa. We interpret this as
being open minded toward the unlikely hypothesis. The early-
acting agents face a trade-off between making a correct decision
and being maximally informative to the later-acting agents.
Index Terms—Bayesian hypothesis testing, distributed detec-
tion, human decision making, likelihood ratio tests, sequential
decision making, social learning, social networks, team theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider decision-making agents facing the task of choos-
ing between two alternatives. Each agent has a private signal,
which is not visible to the other agents. The agents sequentially
make their individual decisions, which are visible to other
agents. An agent’s action contains some information about the
right (or better) choice, so subsequent agents can learn from
the action and reflect it in their own actions. For example,
when you want to choose between two alternatives when
buying a new phone, the choices made by your colleagues
can affect your judgment.
Being influenced by earlier-acting agents has been termed
social learning [1]. It has generally been studied in settings
where each agent has no motivation beyond making a correct
choice for himself. In this paper, we study the effect of an
agent’s action on subsequent agents and find that making
correct decisions is generally not equivalent to providing
information to other agents that maximally benefits them in
their decision making tasks. Accounting for the effect on other
agents could be termed social teaching. Also, in any scenario
with social learning, the earlier-acting agents can be seen as
advisers to the later-acting agents. As will be detailed later, we
find that a good adviser should be open minded in the sense
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of being more receptive to the a priori less likely alternative
than she would have been if she were only interested in being
right rather than also interested in being informative.
The framework of sequential decision making with social
learning was independently introduced in [2] and [3]. These
works focused primarily on herding, which is for all agents
beyond some index to take the same action. They showed that
an incorrect herd would arise with positive probability when
private signals are boundedly informative.1 For example, the
private signals were assumed to be binary and to give true or
false information, each with positive probability. It can happen
that a couple of the first agents receive false private signals and
thus choose wrong actions. Then the effect of these actions on
the beliefs of subsequent agents can be so great as to cause
them to ignore their private signals and follow their precedent
agents. The private signals are bounded so that they cannot be
strong enough to overcome the effect of the wrong actions.
Subsequently, [4] showed that learning is incomplete—
beliefs are not eventually focused on the true state—if private
signals are boundedly informative, but agents will asymptot-
ically settle on the optimal action otherwise. Recently, [5]
extends the result to general network topologies where each
agent can observe decisions made by its neighbors instead of
all previous agents.
In another related line of work, [6] studies the effect of
social learning in a quickest detection problem, in which
agents keep updating their beliefs based on previous decisions
and detect the time at which an underlying state changes. It
has a similar framework to [7], which studied update of private
information in a finite memory.
This paper differentiates itself from the literature in that
it considers unbounded private signals and does not focus
on herding behavior. In addition, we focus largely on the
effect of prior probabilities in decision making. We do not
assume that an agent knows a correct prior probability for the
decision at hand. Even if he does, we do not assume he takes
the shortsighted approach of using the prior probability only
to optimize the correctness of his own decision. Instead, we
study the effect of the prior probability on the decisions of
subsequent agents. Sequential decision making is considered
from a signal-processing perspective in [8] as well. Its model is
similar to ours except that there all agents know the true prior
probability; this difference changes the problem substantially.
Our criterion for optimality is the Bayes risk of the final
agent; we assume a sequential decision making model in
1A signal Y generated under a state H is called boundedly informative if
there exists κ > 0 such that κ < fY ∣H(y ∣h) < 1/κ for all y and h.
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2which only the decision made by the final agent matters. Since
sequential decision making is a hypothesis testing problem,
agents adopt likelihood ratio tests to choose their actions [9].
As they observe decisions or actions chosen by precedent
agents, they compute or update their beliefs to perform more
precise likelihood ratio tests. The update process depends on
the initial prior belief and the history of decisions. We derive
a recursive belief update function.
Bayes-optimal agents need to know the prior probability in
order to perform the likelihood ratio test. Hence, intuitively,
agents with wrong prior beliefs should degrade the decision
making and yield higher Bayes risk. In addition, they would
misunderstand the public signals because they do not know
others’ beliefs.
Contrary to intuition, it turns out that wrong beliefs may
improve the decision made by the final agent in sequential
decision making. Especially when the private signals are
distorted by additive Gaussian noise, the optimal first agent
is open minded: He acts as if the prior probability is larger
than it is in reality when the true prior probability is small,
and vice versa.
Section II provides additional background and motivation
from human decision makers. Section III describes our se-
quential decision making model. In Section IV, we investigate
how agents interpret the decision history, update their beliefs,
and make decisions according to their positions in the chain of
agents. It is proven in Section V that the true prior probability
is not the optimal prior belief for N = 2. Examples for
Gaussian likelihoods are presented in Section VI. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
The mathematical model presented herein abstracts human
decision makers so as to be broadly applicable. We are
motivated in part by a study about the correlation between
a defendant’s physical appearance and juror decisions [10].
It states that jurors feel a defendant more intelligent when
the defendant is wearing eyeglasses, which leads to fewer
guilty verdicts. It also says that wearing eyeglasses is espe-
cially effective for African-American defendants. Several other
studies have also revealed the importance of a defendant’s
physical appearance on a jury’s decision making [11]–[13].
From a logical standpoint, a defendant’s appearance should be
irrelevant to judical decisions because eyeglasses have nothing
to do with crimes, and we believe that jurors do their best to
make fair and reasonable decisions based only on evidence.
Then why does this happen in reality?
We find the answer in Bayesian reasoning and the concept of
prior probability. Let us liken a jury trial to a hypothesis testing
problem. A defendant is metaphorically an object in one of two
states: guilty or not guilty. Perceptions of evidence presented
by a prosecutor or defense counsel are noisy observations
about the defendant’s true state. Jurors are detectors that make
a decision based upon the noisy observations. However, one
element of hypothesis testing is missing: the prior probability
that the defendant commits a crime.
Reasonable human beings resemble Bayesian decision mak-
ers [14]–[17]; they need to know the prior to compute the
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Fig. 1. A sequential decision making model with N agents (Alexis, Blake,
. . . , Norah). The nth agent can observe n−1 decisions made by the precedent
agents.
posterior probability. The prior probability can be critical to
the verdict when the evidence at trial is ambiguous. The
problem is that the jurors cannot know the defendant’s true
prior probability. Hence, before reaching a verdict, the jurors
judge the defendant’s prior probability by how intelligent, how
attractive, how friendly, and how threatening the defendant
“looks.” They may be able to estimate the prior probability
close to the true value but their estimates would not be the
same as the defendant’s true prior probability.
We are not defending or criticizing this phenomenon but
just focusing on an interesting issue raised by it: Human
agents perform Bayesian hypothesis testing with inaccurate
knowledge of prior probabilities. While the prior probability
is one of the basic elements of estimation, the effect of
accuracy of the prior probability has not received a great deal
of attention. Initially building upon [18], we have previously
studied the effect of categorization of problem instances as
inducing quantization of prior probabilities [19]–[22]. The
present paper is more fundamental in that it addresses whether
accurate prior probabilities are even the most favorable. We
have found that inaccurate perception of the prior probability
may be beneficial in sequential decision making.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider the sequential decision making model depicted in
Fig. 1. There is an object in a binary state H ∈ {0,1} with
probability P({H = 0}) = p0 and P({H = 1}) = 1 − p0. There
are also N agents that sequentially detect the state. Agents
do not know the true prior probability of the object. Instead,
the nth agent perceives it as qn. The nth agent observes
decisions made by precedent agents, {Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1}, as well
as a signal about H , Yn, generated from a likelihood function
fYn ∣H .2 The private signals {Yn} are conditionally indepen-
dent given H and are identically distributed. We assume
that the likelihood ratio fYn ∣H(yn ∣1)/fYn ∣H(yn ∣0) is an
increasing function of yn.
The nth agent can extract some information from the n− 1
precedent decisions. The decisions are, however, biased by the
false impressions that the precedent agents have of the object.
Even worse, the nth agent does not know what q1, . . . , qn−1
are. Thus, the nth agent assumes that they are all equal to
qn and interprets the precedent decisions accordingly. Using
the history of decisions, the nth agent updates its prior belief
2The signal in this model has a continuous value while the corrupted signal
has a discrete value in the initially-proposed framework [2], [3].
3before applying its likelihood ratio test. We will define a recur-
sive function that describes the belief update in Section IV.3
Our interest is in the last agent Norah and her decision ĤN .
Upon observing her private signal YN and the N −1 precedent
decisions Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1, she determines her decision rule. We
evaluate the decision rule by a common criterion, Bayes risk,
which measures the expected cost of her decision. The relative
importance of correct decisions and errors can be abstracted
as a cost function c(Ĥ,H), which defines penalties for false
alarm or Type I error (choosing Ĥ = 1 when H = 0), correct
rejection (choosing Ĥ = 0 when H = 0), hit (choosing Ĥ = 1
when H = 1), and missed detection or Type II error (choosing
Ĥ = 0 when H = 1). For simplicity, we assume the correct
decisions have zero cost and use the shorthand notations c10 =
c(1,0) and c01 = c(0,1) respectively for costs of false alarms
and missed detections. In addition, we consider agents have
the same costs; they are a team in the sense of Radner [23].
Then the Bayes risk is given by
RN = c10p0pĤN ∣H(1 ∣0) + c01(1 − p0)pĤN ∣H(0 ∣1). (1)
The computation of (1) depends on the previous decisions
Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1. Therefore, the correct computation of the
expected cost is
RN = ∑
ĥ1,...,ĥN−1
(c10p0pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1 ∣H(1, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1 ∣0)
+c01(1 − p0)pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1 ∣H(0, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1 ∣1)) .
(2)
We will discuss the optimal values of qn that minimize (2).
It is important to note that, in our model, each agent uses
a decision rule optimized for her own belief; the agents do
not adjust their decision rules for the sake of Norah. In other
words, for all n = 1, . . . ,N , the nth agent adopts the decision
rule that minimizes her Bayes risk Rn, and her decision is
shown to the other agents as a public signal. In contrast,
the agents could adjust their decision rules in an attempt to
minimize the Bayes risk of a single collective decision, as
studied for the combination of social learning and aggregation
by voting in [24].
We now introduce additional notation for the rest of the pa-
per. Random variables are in uppercase while their realizations
are in lowercase. We denote a probability density function
(pdf) of a continuous random variable as f and a probability
mass function (pmf) of a discrete random variable as p. A
subscript number n means “of the nth agent.” Superscript
alphabet A (B) means “upon observing Alexis’s (Blake’s)
decision”; we sometimes use 0 or 1 instead of the Roman
alphabet to specify a decision value. For example, qAB3 denotes
the updated belief of the third agent, Chuck, upon observing
Alexis’s and Blake’s decisions Ĥ1 and Ĥ2, and q103 denotes
Chuck’s updated belief upon observing Ĥ1 = 1 and Ĥ2 = 0.
Subscript alphabet A (B) means “that Alexis (Blake) thinks.”
3We use the term belief to distinguish from the true prior probability and to
capture that it is what agents believe as the prior probability. Agents initially
perceive the prior probability in some way, which we call the prior beliefs.
After they observe precedent decisions, they modify the prior beliefs. The
beliefs are then called updated.
For example, Blake thinks that the probability of Alexis
choosing 0 when the true state is 0 is pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣0)B . We
need to clarify who thinks it because the agents are not aware
of others’ prior beliefs. This will be explained in detail in
Section IV-B.
IV. PRIOR BELIEF UPDATE AND DECISION MAKING
Our model assumes unbounded private signals. Thus, unlike
in [2], [3], it is always possible that a subsequent agent may
not follow previous decisions; that is, incorrect herding does
not occur. We now discuss the utilization of a decision history
as well as private signals for Bayesian hypothesis testing. A
position-wise decision-making strategy will be provided. This
can be interpreted as each agent updating his prior belief based
on the decision history and then applying a likelihood ratio test
with his private signal.
A. Alexis, the First Agent
Alexis performs normal binary hypothesis testing because
she has no precedent decision. She use the following likelihood
ratio test with her prior belief q1:
fY1 ∣H(y1 ∣1)
fY1 ∣H(y1 ∣0)
Ĥ1(y1)=1⋛
Ĥ1(y1)=0
c10q1
c01(1 − q1) . (3)
Since the likelihood ratio is increasing in y1, the likelihood
ratio test can be simplified to comparison with an appropriate
decision threshold:
y1
Ĥ1(y1)=1⋛
Ĥ1(y1)=0 λ(q1), (4)
where λ(q) denotes the decision threshold that satisfies
fY ∣H(λ ∣1)
fY ∣H(λ ∣0) = c10qc01(1 − q) . (5)
B. Blake, the Second Agent
Blake observes Alexis’s decision. Considering Ĥ1 as an-
other corrupted signal of H like Y2, he modifies the likelihood
function (3) with his prior belief q2 to
fY2,Ĥ1 ∣H(y2, ĥ1 ∣1)
fY2,Ĥ1 ∣H(y2, ĥ1 ∣0)
Ĥ2(y2)=1⋛
Ĥ2(y2)=0
c10q2
c01(1 − q2) . (6)
In the left-hand side of (6),
fY2,Ĥ1 ∣H(y2, ĥ1 ∣h) = fY2 ∣H(y2 ∣h)pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)
because the private signals Y1 and Y2 are conditionally inde-
pendent given H . We can rewrite (6) as4
fY2 ∣H(y2 ∣1)
fY2 ∣H(y2 ∣0)
Ĥ2(y2)=1⋛
Ĥ2(y2)=0
c10q2
c01(1 − q2) pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)BpĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣1)B . (7)
4The subscript “B” in the term “pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)B ” indicates the value of
pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h) that Blake (the second agent) thinks. We specify this because
Blake does not know Alexis’s belief q1. Thus, he interprets her decision based
on his belief q2. The value is different from the true value of pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h) =
pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)A . Of course, it will be also different from what Chuck—
the third agent—thinks, which is denoted by pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)C . This will be
explained in the next paragraph.
4The likelihood ratio test (7) can be interpreted with Blake
updating his prior belief upon observing Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
Combined with q2, pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)2 updates his prior belief
from q2 to qA2 :
qA2
1 − qA2 = q21 − q2 pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)BpĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣1)B . (8)
The updated belief is
qA2 = q2pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)B
q2pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)B + (1 − q2)pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣1)B
= pĤ1,H(ĥ1,0)B
pĤ1,H(ĥ1,0)B + pĤ1,H(ĥ1,1)B= pH ∣ Ĥ1(0 ∣ ĥ1)B . (9)
We have to make clear that Blake does not correctly
compute pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣h)B because he does not know q1. The
true probability is given by
pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣h) = pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣h)A = P({Y1 ≤ λ(q1) ∣H = h})= ∫ λ(q1)−∞ fY ∣H(y ∣h)dy, (10)
but Blake evaluates Alexis’s decision Ĥ1 as if it were made
based on q2 not q1:
pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣h)B = P({Y1 ≤ λ(q2) ∣H = h})= ∫ λ(q2)−∞ fY ∣H(y ∣h)dy. (11)
An interesting observation is that Alexis’s biased belief q1
does not affect Blake’s belief update. There is no trace of
q1 in (9) and (11). Suppose that Alexis knows true prior
probability p0 and uses the decision threshold λ(p0). Still
Blake, who does not know what belief Alexis has, thinks that
the conditional probability of Alexis declaring Ĥ1 = 0 is given
by (11) and updates his belief as in (9). It is clear in (9) that
the updated belief depends only on Blake’s initial belief and
Alexis’s decision.
However, Alexis’s prior belief still affects Blake’s perfor-
mance in some way, which is related to the probability of error.
Alexis’s biased belief changes the probability of her decision.
The changed probability is embedded in the probability of
Blake’s decision:
pĤ2 ∣H(ĥ2 ∣0) = ∑̂
h1
pĤ2,Ĥ1 ∣H(ĥ2, ĥ1 ∣0)
= pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣0,0)B × pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣0)A+ pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣1,0)B × pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣0)A ,
pĤ2 ∣H(ĥ2 ∣1) = ∑̂
h1
pĤ2,Ĥ1 ∣H(ĥ2, ĥ1 ∣1)
= pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣0,1)B × pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣1)A+ pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣1,1)B × pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣1)A .
Thus, Alexis’s biased belief changes the probability of Blake’s
decision as well as that of her decision.
C. Chuck, the Third Agent
Chuck’s detection process is the same as Blake’s. He
observes both Alexis’s and Blake’s decisions and also updates
his prior belief q3 like in (8):
qAB3
1 − qAB3 = q31 − q3 pĤ2,Ĥ1 ∣H(ĥ2, ĥ1 ∣0)CpĤ2,Ĥ1 ∣H(ĥ2, ĥ1 ∣1)C
= ⎛⎝ q31 − q3 pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)CpĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣1)C ⎞⎠
pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣ ĥ1,0)C
pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣ ĥ1,1)C .
Be careful that Ĥ1 and Ĥ2 are not conditionally independent
given H because Blake’s decision Ĥ2 depends on Alexis’s
decision Ĥ1:
pĤ2∣Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣ ĥ1,0) ≠ pĤ2∣H(ĥ2 ∣0).
Chuck’s update process can be split into in two steps. The
first step is to infer Blake’s updated belief based on Alexis’s
decision:
qA3
1 − qA3 = q31 − q3 pĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣0)CpĤ1 ∣H(ĥ1 ∣1)C . (12)
The second step is to update his own belief from qA3 based on
Blake’s decision:
qAB3
1 − qAB3 = q
A
3
1 − qA3 pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣ ĥ1,0)CpĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(ĥ2 ∣ ĥ1,1)C . (13)
Please note that Chuck does not know Alexis’s and Blake’s
prior beliefs, q1 and q2, like Blake did not know Alexis’s. Thus
Chuck infers everything based on his own belief q3, which is
indicated by the subscript “C” in (12) and (13).
Details of computations of (12) and (13) are as follows:
pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣h)C = ∫ λ(q3)−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣h)dy, (14a)
pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣h)C = ∫ ∞λ(q3) fY1 ∣H(y ∣h)dy. (14b)
Substituting (14) in (12), Chuck can compute qA3 for Ĥ1 = 0
and Ĥ1 = 1 respectively:
q03 = q3
q3 + (1 − q3) ∫ λ(q3)−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy∫ λ(q3)−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy
, (15a)
q13 = q3
q3 + (1 − q3) ∫ ∞λ(q3) fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy∫ ∞λ(q3) fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy . (15b)
Then,
pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(0 ∣ ĥ1, h)3 = P({Y2 ≤ λ(qA3) ∣H = h})= ∫ λ(qA3 )−∞ fY2 ∣H(y ∣h)dy, (16a)
pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(1 ∣ ĥ1, h)3 = P({Y2 > λ(qA3) ∣H = h})= ∫ ∞
λ(qA3 ) fY2 ∣H(y ∣h)dy. (16b)
Even though the value of ĥ1 may not seem to be used in (16),
it is inherent in qA3 and affects the computation results. Chuck’s
updated belief qAB3 is obtained by substituting (15) and (16) in
(13).
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Fig. 2. The function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3)—updated belief of the fourth agent
(qABC4 )—for each possible combination of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and Chuck’s
decisions [ĥ1 ĥ2 ĥ3] when c10 = c01 = 1 and private signals are distorted
by additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. The updated
belief is mostly dependent on Chuck’s decision; the top four curves are for
ĥ3 = 0 and the bottom four curves are for ĥ3 = 1.
D. Norah, the N th Agent
Norah, the N th agent, observes YN and Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1.
Paralleling the arguments in the preceding sections, her prior
belief update is a function of qN as well as Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1 but
not of q1, . . . , qN−1. Thus, we can define a general prior belief
update function:
qAB⋯MN = UN(qN , ĥ1, ĥ2, . . . , ĥN−1).
The function Un has a recurrence relation:● For n = 1, U1(q) = q.● For n > 1,
Un(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2,0) = q˜
q˜ + (1 − q˜) ∫ λ(q˜)−∞ fYn−1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy∫ λ(q˜)−∞ fYn−1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy
,
Un(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2,1) = q˜
q˜ + (1 − q˜) ∫ ∞λ(q˜) fYn−1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy∫ ∞λ(q˜) fYn−1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy ,
where q˜ = Un−1(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2).
Fig. 2 depicts the function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3) for N = 4 for
eight possible combinations of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and Chuck’s
decisions [ĥ1 ĥ2 ĥ3]. An interesting property of Un is that
the updated belief is much more dependent on the most recent
decision ĥn−1 than on the earlier decisions ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2. This
is especially the case when the (n−1)st agent has not followed
precedent. This is because the nth agent rationally concludes
that the (n − 1)st agent observed strong evidence to justify a
deviation from precedent. For example, if the decision history
of the first five agents is [0 0 0 0 1] then the sixth agent
takes the last decision 1 seriously even though four agents
chose 0. A reversal of an arbitrarily long precedent sequence
may occur because we assume unbounded private signals; if
private signals are bounded like in [2], [3], then the influence
of precedent can reach a point where agents cannot receive a
signal strong enough to justify a decision running counter to
precedent.
V. OPTIMAL INITIAL BELIEF
We have constructed the prior belief update and decision
making model in Section IV. In this section, we want to
investigate when the system can achieve the minimum Bayes
risk. For simplicity, we only consider N = 2. Note that the
Bayes risk of the system is the same as Blake’s Bayes risk
because his decision is adopted as the final decision.
Let us recapitulate the computation of Blake’s Bayes risk.
Alexis chooses her decision threshold as λ1 = λ(q1). Her
probabilities of errors are given by
P Ie,1 = pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣0) = ∫ ∞λ1 fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy,
P IIe,1 = pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣1) = ∫ λ1−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy.
Blake thinks that Alexis uses the decision threshold λ1B =
λ(q2) and computes her probabilities of errors differently:
P Ie,1B = pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣0)B = ∫ ∞λ1B fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy, (17a)
P IIe,1B = pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣1)B = ∫ λ1B−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy. (17b)
When Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 0, Blake updates his belief q2
to q02:
q02
1 − q02 = q21 − q2 1 − P
I
e,1B
P IIe,1B
Ô⇒ q02 = q2(1 − P Ie,1B)
q2(1 − P Ie,1B) + (1 − q2)P IIe,1B , (18)
and his decision threshold is λ02 = λ(q02). His probabilities of
errors are given by
P I0e,2 = pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(1 ∣0,0) = ∫ ∞λ02 fY2 ∣H(y ∣0)dy, (19a)
P II0e,2 = pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(0 ∣0,1) = ∫ λ02−∞ fY2 ∣H(y ∣1)dy. (19b)
Likewise, when Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 1, Blake updates his
belief q2 to q12:
q12
1 − q12 = q21 − q2 P
I
e,1B
1 − P IIe,1B
Ô⇒ q12 = q2P Ie,1B
q2P
I
e,1B
+ (1 − q2)(1 − P IIe,1B) , (20)
and his decision threshold is λ12 = λ(q12). His probabilities of
errors are given by
P I1e,2 = pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(1 ∣1,0) = ∫ ∞λ12 fY2 ∣H(y ∣0)dy, (21a)
P II1e,2 = pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(0 ∣1,1) = ∫ λ12−∞ fY2 ∣H(y ∣1)dy. (21b)
6Now we can compute Blake’s Bayes risk R2:
R2 = c10pĤ2,H(1,0) + c01pĤ2,H(0,1)= c10pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(1 ∣0,0)pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣0)pH(0)+ c10pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(1 ∣1,0)pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣0)pH(0)+ c01pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(0 ∣0,1)pĤ1 ∣H(0 ∣1)pH(1)+ c01pĤ2 ∣ Ĥ1,H(0 ∣1,1)pĤ1 ∣H(1 ∣1)pH(1)= c10 [P I0e,2 (1 − P Ie,1) + P I1e,2 P Ie,1]p0+ c01 [P II0e,2 P IIe,1 + P II1e,2 (1 − P IIe,1)] (1 − p0). (22)
The Bayes risk R2 in (22) is a function of q1 and q2. It
seems natural that R2 is minimum at q1 = q2 = p0 because
Alexis will make the best decision she can and Blake will
not misunderstand her decision. Surprisingly, however, this
turns out not to be true. We will prove it by studying Alexis’s
optimal belief q∗1 with respect to minimizing R2.
Let us consider the first derivative of (22) with respect to
q1:
dR2
dq1
= c10p0(P I1e,2−P I0e,2)dP Ie,1dq1 +c01(1−p0)(P II0e,2−P II1e,2 )dP
II
e,1
dq1
.
We want to find q1 that makes this first derivative zero. Using
dP Ie,1
dq1
= dP Ie,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= −fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣0)dλ1dq1 ,
dP IIe,1
dq1
= dP IIe,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣1)dλ1dq1 ,
this occurs when
c10p0(P I1e,2 − P I0e,2)fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣0)= c01(1 − p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2 )fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣1)
⇐⇒ fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣1)
fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣0) = c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
c01(1 − p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2 ) . (23)
Note that λ1 = λ(q1) is a solution to (5),
fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣1)
fY1 ∣H(λ1 ∣0) = c10q1c01(1 − q1) .
Therefore Alexis’s optimal belief q∗1 needs to satisfy
q∗1
1 − q∗1 = p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)(1 − p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2 ) , (24)
where the value of (P I1e,2 − P I0e,2)/(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2 ) does not have
to be 1. In fact, in additive Gaussian noise cases, it is not equal
to one except for p0 = c01/(c10 + c01). Therefore, the optimal
value of q1 is not p0 in general.
VI. EXAMPLE: GAUSSIAN LIKELIHOODS
Suppose that the nth agent receives the signal Yn =H +Wn
where the additive noises Wn are iid with pdf
fW (w) = 1√
2pi
e−w2/2. (25)
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Fig. 3. Visualization of the Bayes risk for various q1 and q2 for N = 2,
c10 = c01 = 1, p = 0.3, and additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit
variance. Alexis’s and Blake’s optimal prior beliefs (▲) are different from the
true prior probability (●).
Each likelihood fYn∣H is thus Gaussian with mean H and
variance σ2. For a prior belief qn, the likelihood ratio test
fYn ∣H(yn ∣1)
fYn ∣H(yn ∣0)
Ĥn(yn)=1⋛
Ĥn(yn)=0
c10qn
c01(1 − qn) (26)
is simplified to the following comparison:
yn
Ĥn(yn)=1⋛
Ĥn(yn)=0 λn = 12 + log c10qnc01(1 − qn) . (27)
Fig. 3 clearly shows that knowing true prior probability
is not optimal. We have computed the performance of the
sequential decision making by two agents for c10 = c01 = 1,
p = 0.3, and additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit
variance. The Bayes risk is minimum when Alexis perceives
the prior probability as 0.38 and Blake perceives it as 0.23,
which is marked with a triangle. For convenience, the true
probability is indicated by a circle.
Figs. 4 and 5 depict the prior beliefs that the agents should
have for optimal decision making. They show several common
characteristics for the additive Gaussian noise model: First,
the non-terminal agents (i.e., Alexis for N = 2 and Alexis and
Blake for N = 3) should have belief larger than p0 when p0 is
small and belief smaller than p0 when p0 is large. We call this
open-mindedness because it is to assign higher prior belief to
outcomes that are very unlikely. Second, the last agent (i.e.,
Blake for N = 2 and Chuck for N = 3) should have belief
smaller than p0 when p0 is small and belief larger than p0
when p0 is large. This is necessary to compensate for the
biases of precedent agents. Last, there is a unique point, except
for p0 = 0 or p0 = 1, where all agents’ optimal prior beliefs
are the same as the true prior probability. It occurs at p0 =
c01/(c10 + c01). We prove this for N = 2 in the appendix. We
also show there for N = 2 that the first agent should be open
minded.
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Fig. 4. The trend of the optimal prior beliefs for varying p0 for N = 2
(Alexis and Blake). (a) c10 = c01 = 1. (b) c10 = 1, c01 = 3.
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Fig. 5. The trend of the optimal prior beliefs for varying p0 for N = 3
(Alexis, Blake, and Chuck). (a) c10 = c01 = 1. (b) c10 = 1, c01 = 3.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed decision making sequentially performed
by a group of agents that make decisions based on individually
biased prior beliefs. Instead of investigating herding on a
wrong action, we have assumed unbounded private signals
and focused on the agents’ belief update. The Bayes-optimal
updated belief turns out to be the probability of each hypoth-
esis conditioned on the decisions made by previous agents.
It gets more difficult for agents in later positions to make
decisions that differ from precedents; however, if one observes
a very strong signal against the precedents and chooses the
alternative, the decision will be taken very seriously by the
following agents.
The wrong beliefs held by previous agents change the prob-
ability that following agents choose each hypothesis. Contrary
to intuition, however, wrong beliefs are not always bad. In fact,
the optimal beliefs of agents (those that lead to the minimum
Bayes risk for the last agent) are not usually equal to the
true prior probability. Specifically, in the case of observations
corrupted by iid additive Gaussian noises, an agent biased
toward c01/(c10 + c01) can be more beneficial to subsequent
agents than is an accurate agent is. The point c01/(c10 + c01)
is special because the probabilities of false alarms and missed
detections will be balanced by the optimal decision rule at the
prior probability. In terms of human decision making, where
precedent agents are advisers or counselors to the last agent
who has the final decisive power, we can say that the best
advisers are necessarily open-minded people.
The idea of an open-minded adviser is related to the amount
of information conveyed in the public signals. A public signal
is a quantized version of a private signal while also simul-
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Fig. 6. The difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of
(29). (a) h1 = 1. (b) h1 = 0.5.
taneously reflecting an agent’s belief. Alexis’s decision will
reflect her belief more than her private signal when her belief
is very small (close to 0) or very large (close to 1). However,
Blake would want a public signal that is most informative of
Alexis’s private signal. Therefore, he wants her to make her
decision with a less extreme belief or an open mind.
While some conclusions of our study depend on having
Gaussian likelihoods and may not hold for different types of
additive noise, it is more generally true that the optimal prior
beliefs are different from the true prior probability.
APPENDIX
ALEXIS’S OPTIMAL PRIOR BELIEF FOR BLAKE
For the case of N = 2, we investigate Alexis’s prior belief
that minimizes Blake’s Bayes risk. Let us assume that
fY ∣H(y ∣0) = 1√
2piσ2
exp(− y2
2σ2
) , (28a)
fY ∣H(y ∣1) = 1√
2piσ2
exp(−(y − h1)2
2σ2
) , (28b)
where σ and h1 are arbitrary positive numbers.
Conjecture 1. If λ < h1/2, then
∫ λ−∞ exp(−y22 + λh1) dy∫ ∞λ exp(−y22 + λh1) dy
< ∫ λ−∞ exp(−y22 + yh1) dy∫ ∞λ exp(−y22 + yh1) dy.
(29)
Fig. 6 depicts the difference between the left-hand side and
the right-hand side of (29) for two values of h1 and supports
the conjecture. In the following we assume the conjecture to
be true.
Lemma 2. If λ < h1/2, then
∫ λ−∞ exp(− y22σ2 + λh1σ2 ) dy∫ ∞λ exp(− y22σ2 + λh1σ2 ) dy
< ∫ λ−∞ exp(− y22σ2 + yh1σ2 ) dy∫ ∞λ exp(−y22 + yh1σ2 ) dy.
(30)
8Proof: Substituting y′ = y/σ, λ′ = λ/σ, and h′1 = h′1/σ,
we obtain
∫ λ−∞ exp(− y22σ2 + λh1σ2 ) dy∫ ∞λ exp(− y22σ2 + λh1σ2 ) dy
= σ2 ∫ λ′−∞ exp(−y′22 + λ′h′1) dy′ ∫ ∞λ′ exp(−y′22 + λ′h′1) dy′
and
∫ λ−∞ exp(− y22σ2 + yh1σ2 ) dy∫ ∞λ exp(−y22 + yh1σ2 ) dy
= σ2 ∫ λ′−∞ exp(−y′22 + y′h′1) dy′ ∫ ∞λ′ exp(−y′22 + y′h′1) dy′.
Since λ < h1/2 implies λ′ < h′1/2, (30) follows from Conjec-
ture 1.
Theorem 3. Alexis’s and Blake’s optimal prior beliefs are
equal to the true prior probability p0 if p0 = c01/(c10 + c01).
Proof: We will show that ∂R2/∂q1 = 0 and ∂R2/∂q2 = 0
for q1 = q2 = p0 = c01/(c10 + c01). Then they are Alexis’s and
Blake’s optimal prior beliefs q∗1 and q∗2 .
First, consider ∂R2/∂q2 using (22):
∂R2
∂q2
= −c10p0 [(1 − P Ie,1)fY2 ∣H(λ02 ∣0)dλ02dq2 + P Ie,1fY2 ∣H(λ12 ∣0)dλ
1
2
dq2
]
+ c01(1 − p0) [P IIe,1fY2 ∣H(λ02 ∣1)dλ02dq2 + (1 − P IIe,1)fY2 ∣H(λ12 ∣1)dλ
1
2
dq2
] .
(31)
From (18) and (27),
λ02 = λ1B + log 1 − P Ie,1BP IIe,1B ,
and its derivative is given by
dλ02
dq2
= dλ1B
dq2
− dP Ie,1B
dq2
1
1 − P Ie,1B −
dP IIe,1B
dq2
1
P IIe,1B
= ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1 +
fY1 ∣H(λ1B ∣0)
1 − P Ie,1B −
fY1 ∣H(λ1B ∣1)
P IIe,1B
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
dλ1B
dq2
. (32)
Likewise,
λ12 = λ1B + log P Ie,1B1 − P IIe,1B ,
and its derivative is
dλ12
dq2
= ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1 −
fY1 ∣H(λ1B ∣0)
P Ie,1B
+ fY1 ∣H(λ1B ∣1)
1 − P IIe,1B
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
dλ1B
dq2
. (33)
In addition, q1 = q2 implies that P Ie,1B = P Ie,1 and P IIe,1B =
P IIe,1 , and we can derive the following relations for q1 = q2 =
p0:
fY2 ∣H(λ02 ∣1)
fY2 ∣H(λ02 ∣0) = c10q2(1 − P
I
e,1B
)
c01(1 − q2)P IIe,1B =
c10p0(1 − P Ie,1)
c01(1 − p0)P IIe,1 ,
fY2 ∣H(λ12 ∣1)
fY2 ∣H(λ12 ∣0) = c10q2P
I
e,1B
c01(1 − q2)(1 − P IIe,1B) =
c10p0P
I
e,1
c01(1 − p0)(1 − P IIe,1) .
(34)
By substituting (32) and (33) in (31) and using the rela-
tions (34), we obtain that ∂R2/∂q2 = 0 at q1 = q2 = p0.
Next, we consider ∂R2/∂q1, which is zero at q1 and q2 that
satisfy (24),
q1(1 − q1) = p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)(1 − p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2 ) .
The condition q2 = c01/(c10 + c01) leads to λ1B = h1/2 and
P Ie,1B = P IIe,1B . Hence, λ02−λ1B = λ1B−λ12 and λ02 = 1−λ12 . Then,
from (19) and (21), we obtain P I0e,2 = P II1e,2 and P I1e,2 = P II0e,2 .
Therefore, only q2 = p0 completes (24) and makes ∂R2/∂q1
zero.
Theorem 4. Let p0 ∈ (0,1) denote the true prior probability
and q∗1 Alexis’s (i.e., the first agent’s) optimal prior belief.● If p0 < c01/(c10 + c01), then p0 < q∗1 < c01/(c10 + c01).● If p0 = c01/(c10 + c01), then q∗1 = p0.● If p0 > c01/(c10 + c01), then c01/(c10 + c01) < q∗1 < p0.
Proof: First, the proof for the case when p0 =
c01/(c10 + c01) is given in Theorem 3.
Next, suppose that p0 < c01/(c10 + c01). Let λ in (30) denote
a decision threshold according to q∗2 . Obviously, optimal prior
beliefs q∗1 and q∗2 should be strictly decreasing as p0 decreases
like in Fig. 2. Hence, Theorem 3, which states that q∗1 = q∗2 =
c01/(c10 + c01) if p0 = c01/(c10 + c01), implies that
q∗1 < c01c10 + c01 and q∗2 < c01c10 + c01 (35)
if p0 < c01/(c10 + c01). Then we get λ < h1/2 and can use (30).
Multiplying each integrand in (30) by the constant
1
2piσ2
exp(− λ2
2σ2
− h21
2σ2
), we get
∫ λ−∞ 12piσ2 exp(−(λ − h1)22σ2 ) exp(− y22σ2 ) dy
× ∫ ∞
λ
1
2piσ2
exp(−(λ − h1)2
2σ2
) exp(− y2
2σ2
) dy
< ∫ λ−∞ 12piσ2 exp(− λ22σ2 ) exp(−(y − h1)22σ2 ) dy
× ∫ ∞
λ
1
2piσ2
exp(− λ2
2σ2
) exp(−(y − h1)2
2σ2
) dy. (36)
According to (28), the exponential functions in (36) are
likelihood functions of Y1, so we have
f2Y1 ∣H(λ ∣1)∫ λ−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy∫ ∞λ fY1 ∣H(y ∣0)dy< f2Y1 ∣H(λ ∣0)∫ λ−∞ fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy∫ ∞λ fY1 ∣H(y ∣1)dy.
(37)
Since λ = λ(q∗2), using (17), we obtain
P Ie,1B(1 − P Ie,1B)
f2
Y1 ∣H(λ ∣0) <
P IIe,1B(1 − P IIe,1B)
f2
Y1 ∣H(λ ∣1) , (38)
and (5) transforms (38) to
c210q
∗2
2 P
I
e,1B
(1 − P Ie,1B) < c201(1 − q∗2)2P IIe,1B(1 − P IIe,1B).
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Fig. 7. The point B0 (P I0e,2 , P II0e,2 ) always exists between the points B¯1(P II1e,2 , P I1e,2) and B1 (P I1e,2 , P II1e,2 ).
Rearranging terms gives us
⎛⎝ c10q∗2c01(1 − q∗2) 1 − P
I
e,1B
P IIe,1B
⎞⎠
−1 > c10q∗2
c01(1 − q∗2) P
I
e,1B
1 − P IIe,1B . (39)
The terms in the left-hand and the right-hand sides are the
same as the belief update formulae (18) and (20), so this
simplifies to
( c10q02
c01(1 − q02))
−1 > c10q12
c01(1 − q12) . (40)
Let us discuss the meaning of the inequality (40). In
Fig. 7, the convex curve depicts a flipped version of the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC). When the prior belief
is q, the error probabilities (P Ie,2 , P IIe,2) are determined as the
point of tangency, where the curve meets a line with slope−c10q/c01(1−q). Two solid lines in Fig. 7 depict the lines for
Blake’s updated beliefs after observing Ĥ1 = 0 and Ĥ1 = 1,
respectively denoted by q02 and q
1
2 .
The inequality (40) restricts the range of error probabilities
in which (P I0e,2 , P II0e,2 ) can exist on the basis of (P I1e,2 , P II1e,2 );
the point B0 (P I0e,2 , P II0e,2 ), a black dot, always exists on the
right side of the point B¯1 (P II1e,2 , P I1e,2), a gray diamond.
Furthermore, the point B0 cannot exist on the right side of
the point B1 (P I1e,2 , P II1e,2 ), a black diamond, because obviously
q02 > q12 . Therefore, the point B0 always exists on the curve
between the points B¯1 and B1 .
Now we draw a black dotted line that connects the points
B0 and B1 and a gray dashed line that connects the points B¯1
and B1 . From the restriction for the point B0 , the slope of the
former is always greater than that of the latter:
P II1e,2 − P II0e,2
P I1e,2 − P I0e,2 > −1. (41)
We have obtained the optimality condition (24) for Alexis’s
prior belief in Section V. We can rewrite it as
q∗1 = p0
p0 + (1 − p0)P II0e,2 −P II1e,2
P
I1
e,2−P I0e,2
. (42)
Finally, we can conclude that q∗1 > p0 because of (41).
In addition, Alexis’s optimal belief q∗1 is upper-bounded by
c01/(c10 + c01) because q∗1 is strictly decreasing in p0 and
q∗1 = c01/(c10 + c01) when p0 = c01/(c10 + c01) by Theorem 3.
Combining these two bounds, we have the inequality
p0 < q∗1 < c01c10 + c01 , (43)
as desired.
The statement that c01/(c10 + c01) < q∗1 < p0 if p0 >
c01/(c10 + c01) can be proven similarly.
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